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Abstract
I model the strategic interaction between ﬁrms, that face decisions on in-
vestment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment
decision that takes place after ﬁrms have contracted forward but before ﬁrms
compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition be-
comes ﬁerce. Thus, the eﬃciency gains from forward trading found by Allaz
and Villa (1993) still are present. However, for an investment that takes place
before ﬁrms contract forward (long term investment), competition becomes
rather weak. When investment matters, from a welfare point of view the
desirability of forward trading critically depends on the structure of decision
making.
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1 Introduction
Commodity markets like that for oil, gas, power and steel show several char-
acteristics of imperfect competition. Due to the very specialized knowledge
needed as well as the high requirement of capital and the economics of scale,
there exist entry barriers and as a result commodity markets are often dom-
inated by few oligopolistic ﬁrms.
Especially on commodity markets investment decisions play a crucial role for
strategic competition. There are very long lasting investments like that for
building up a plant, exploring a mine, building up a pipeline or introducing
a cost-reducing new technology. Other investments like that for building up
capacities in an existing plant, distributing or advertising the product have
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a shorter time horizon. The importance of investment decisions on these
markets can in particular be illustrated by the German power market. The
annually investment costs for the ongoing turnaround to a sustainable en-
ergy supply are estimated by The German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW Berlin) (Blazejczak, Diekmann, Edler, Kemfert, Neuhoﬀ, and Schill,
2013) up to 38. billion Euro. From this total amount of 38 billion Euro ap-
proximately 26 billion Euro are needed for investments in power and heating
supply and 7 billion Euro for investments in the electricity network.
Another market characteristic of many commodity markets and especially for
the power market is the fact that a substantial proportion of ﬁrms' output is
not sold directly to consumer on a spot market but rather to speculators on
a futures market, who sell the commodity in the end to consumers. For ex-
ample on the European Energy Exchange in 2012 339 terawatt-hours (tWh)
have been traded on the spot market, whereas 931 tWh have been traded on
the forward market. Thus, about 73% of the total market volume has been
traded forward (European-Energy-Exchange, 2012).
The contribution of the presented paper is twofold: Firstly it contributes to
the economic literature in modeling simultaneously two especially for com-
modity markets important strategic decisions: The decision on investment
and on forward trading. Secondly it contributes to the ongoing debate about
the market design needed for the German energy turnaround as well: It
shows that instruments like forward trading, which theirselves increase com-
petition, may lead to anti-competitive eﬀects, since they inﬂuence other im-
portant strategic decisions like that on investment.
Even though, many markets on which a substantial amount is traded on a
futures or forward market are characterized by a structure of few oligopolisitc
ﬁrms, there exists rather few literature about the strategic aspects of forward
trading. To be successful on an oligopolistic market each ﬁrm has to incor-
porate all actions and reactions of it's competitors. Thus, strategic behavior
becomes important and the methods typically used in industrial organization
are suitable to analyze ﬁrms behavior on commodity markets and to predict
market results.
Ronald W. Anderson has been one of the ﬁrst to bridge this gap in dis-
cussing the two-way eﬀects of market imperfections and futures trading. At
his initiative the conference "The industrial organization of future markets:
structure and conduct" was organized in 1982 to discuss the eﬀects of imper-
fect competition and futures markets. All papers of this conference have been
collected and published by Anderson (1984) under the title "The Industrial
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Organization of Futures Markets". Most of the papers focus the possibility
of market manipulations with forward contracts (e.g. Newbery (1998) and
Kyle (1984)) or disadvantageous self regulation Saloner (1984). However,
one contribution, namely that of Anderson and Sundaresan (1984), directly
addresses the problem of imperfect competition and market power on futures
markets.
At the same time Greenstone (1981) described in detail how coﬀee exporting
countries formed pancafe and the bogota group to collude on a higher world
market coﬀee price. One popular tool, which has been used for their coordi-
nation, were forward contracts. However, it needed more ten twenty years,
until Liski and Montero (2006) analyzed the eﬀects of forward trading on col-
luding ﬁrms in a theoretical framework. They modeled for price as well as for
quantity competition collusive incentives of one period forward contracts in
a deterministic market environment. Then Green and Coq (2010) analyzed
in a similar setting the collusive eﬀects of forwards with varying contract
length. Based on these papers Aichele (2013) models the collusive incentives
for price-setting ﬁrms in a stochastic and volatile market environment. He
shows the negative eﬀect on ﬁrms proﬁt, when a collusive agreement is sta-
bilized with forward contracts.
The eﬀects of forward trading on (imperfectly) competing ﬁrms, are modeled
by Mahenc and Salanié (2004) for price setting ﬁrms with a heterogeneous
good and by Allaz and Villa (1993) for quantity setting ﬁrms and a ho-
mogenous product. The welfare eﬀects of both models contradict each other,
since for price competition and heterogenous products (Mahenc and Salanié,
2004) forward trading leads to weaker competition, whereas for homogenous
products and quantity competition (Allaz and Villa, 1993) forward trading
leads to ﬁercer competition. In an "inﬁnite horizon, discrete time dynamic
game of forward trading with storage" Thille (2003, p.652) shows that the
welfare enhancing eﬀects found by Allaz and Villa (1993) still are present
in a mitigated fashion, when storage of the commodity is possible. Another
interesting paper on this issue that discusses theoretically as well as empir-
ically the question whether forward contracts are mainly used for strategic
or risk hedging motives is that of van Eijkel and Moraga-González (2010).
There recently have been contributions about investment incentives in com-
plex market structures of network industries, of which especially three con-
tributions should be mentioned here. Choi and Kim (2010) focus on the
interaction between net neutrality and investment incentives for Internet ser-
vice providers and conclude "that the relationship between the net neutrality
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regulation and investment incentives is subtle" (Choi and Kim, 2010, p.34).
Valletti and Cambini (2005) model the interaction between investments and
network competition for telecommunication operators and ﬁnd tendencies
for strategic underinvestment in network quality. Fabra, von der Fehr, and
de Frutos (2011) study the interaction between market design and investment
incentives for energy markets. Therefore, they model the investment incen-
tives for a discriminatory and for a uniform-price auction. Even though their
contribution leads to important insights concerning investment decisions and
energy markets, the important strategic decision about forward contracts
cannot be analyzed. The presented paper ﬁlls this gap, even though at the
cost of a much simpler market mechanism on the spot market.
To what extent imperfectly competing ﬁrms invest depends mainly on whether
the decision variables such as quantity, price and investment are seen as
strategic complements or substitutes (see the inﬂuential contributions of Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)).
As will be shown in the presented paper, the market performance additionally
depends signiﬁcantly on the time horizon of ﬁrms investment decision. For a
long lasting investment decision that takes place before ﬁrms trade forward
and compete in quantities competition is rather weak and a rather low social
welfare is achieved. In contrast to this, for shorter investment decisions, that
take place after ﬁrms have traded forward but before ﬁrms compete in quan-
tities, competition becomes ﬁerce and social welfare becomes rather high.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the main assump-
tions and the structure of the model are presented. In section 3 a long term
strategic investment is modeled. Therefore, in a ﬁrst stage ﬁrms choose their
investment before in a second stage ﬁrms engage in forward contracts and in
a third stage they compete in quantities. In section 4 a mid term strategic
investment is modeled. Therefore, in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms engage in forward
contracts before they decide about an investment in the second stage and
before they compete in quantities in the third stage.
In section 5 the results of both decision structures are compared to another.
They are also compared to the results of a two stage game consisting of a
forward trading stage followed by quantity competition as well as to a two
stage game consisting of an investment decision followed by quantity com-
petition. The results of both two stage games are derived in a simple and
concise form in the appendix. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The model
The model that is presented in this paper adds an additional third stage of
investment decision to the two stage model of Allaz and Villa (1993). In the
contribution of Allaz and Villa (1993), in a ﬁrst stage ﬁrms can engage in
contracts (forward market stage) and in a second stage ﬁrms serve these con-
tracts and sell an additional quantity to the customers (spot market stage).
In order to compare the results of the presented paper with the results of
Allaz and Villa (1993) all underlying assumptions are chosen closely to the
assumptions made by Allaz and Villa (1993).
Firms compete in quantities and face a linear (inverse) demand function
p = a−xi−xj, where the production that is sold by ﬁrm i either via forward
contracts or directly on the spot market is denoted by xi, xj respectively.
There is perfect foresight of all market participants and in equilibrium the
forward market has to be eﬃcient, which means "the forward price as a func-
tion of the forward positions must be equal to the price that will result from
cournot competition on the spot market given these positions" (Allaz and
Villa, 1993). The total production xi of each ﬁrm i can either be sold by a
ﬁrm via a binding and observable forward contract denoted by fi or directly
on the spot market. Thus, the amount that is sold on the spot market by ﬁrm
i is given by the diﬀerence of the total production and the amount already
traded forward before (xsmi = xi − fi).
To focus exclusively on the strategic aspects of investment decisions, forward
trading and quantity competition on the spot market, this papers works
with deterministic market conditions. Alternatively the results could be in-
terpreted as the results of a model with risk neutral agents competing under
uncertainty.
In the presented model ﬁrms decide about an investment Ii, that increases
their contribution margin linearly by exactly Ii but produces quadratic costs
of I2i , I
2
i . This investment Ii can either by interpreted as a level of technol-
ogy, that decreases marginal costs (c − Ii) or as an advertising campaign,
that increases the prohibitive price (a+ Ii).
In section 3 the market results from competition of a long term strategic
investment is derived. Therefore, following three stage game is solved by
backward induction:
Structure of decision making for a long term strategic investment
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Stage 1. (Cost reducing) Investment:
Firms decide about an (cost reducing) investment. They anticipate the
eﬀect on the quantities being delivered on the forward market as well
as on the spot market.
Stage 2. Forward market:
Firms decide about the quantity they contract forward. They take
the investment of both ﬁrms as given and anticipate all eﬀects on the
quantity competition on the spot market.
Stage 3. Quantity competition:
Firms take the investment as well as the forward contracts of both
ﬁrms as given and decide about the (additional) quantity they want to
supply on the spot market.
In section 4 the market results from competition of a mid term strategic
investment is derived. Therefore, following three stage game is solved by
backward induction:
Structure of decision making for a mid term strategic investment
Stage 1. Forward market:
Firms decide about the quantity they contract forward. They antici-
pate the eﬀects on the investment decisions as well as on the quantities
delivered on the spot market.
Stage 2. (Demand increasing) Investment:
Firms decide about their investment. They take as given the amount
contracted forward in the ﬁrst stage and anticipate all eﬀects on the
quantity competition on the spot market.
Stage 3. Quantity competition:
Firms take as given the forward contracts as well as the investment of
both ﬁrms as given and decide about the (additional) quantity they
want to supply on the spot market.
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3 Long term strategic investment
3.1 Quantity competition, in which ﬁrms take costs and
forward contracts as given
In the third stage, each ﬁrms' investment as well as the forward contracted
amount is given. Thus, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm can be stated as:
Πi = (a− xi − xj) (xi − fi) − (c− Ii)xi (1)
In the third stage, each ﬁrm i decides about the quantity it supplies on the
spot market (xsmi = xi − fi), where the forward traded amount fi is given
from the decision made in the ﬁrst stage. The cost for each unit sold (either
to consumers or to speculators) are given by the marginal cost less the level
of technology c−Ii. The marginal cost, which have been reduced by the level
of technology c−Ii, incur to the total output xi. Maximizing the spot market
proﬁt of each ﬁrm, given by equation 1, in respect to the total quantity xi,
yields the best quantity response of a ﬁrm. This reaction function of ﬁrm i
depends on the prohibitive price a, the marginal costs c the amount traded
forward by each ﬁrm fi, fj, the own investment Ii and the quantity set by the
rival ﬁrm xj. For the reaction function of ﬁrm j the same holds true except
that i has to be changed in j and vice versa.
xi =
1
2
(a+ fi − c+ Ii − xj) (2)
Both ﬁrms perfectly take into account the quantity set by the rival. The
Nash-equilibrium (x∗i,j), in which neither ﬁrm has an incentive to set another
quantity, is found in the intersection point of both reaction functions.
x∗i =
1
3
(a+ 2fi − fj + 2Ii − Ij − c) (3)
The quantity set in equilibrium by ﬁrm i depends positively on the prohibitive
price a, the own forward contracted amount fi and the own investment Ii.
The quantity depends negatively on the competitors forward traded amount
fj, the competitors investment Ij and marginal cost c. The same functional
form holds true for the quantity set by ﬁrm j. With these optimal quantities
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in the third stage the (reduced form) spot-market equilibrium price p∗sm can
easily be determined as:
p∗sm =
1
3
(a+ 2c− fi − fj − Ii − Ij) (4)
The (reduced form) spot-market equilibrium price p∗sm depends positively on
the prohibitive price a as well as on marginal costs c. It depends negatively
on each ﬁrms' forward traded amount fi, fj and each ﬁrms investment Ii, Ij.
3.2 Decision on forward contracts, in which ﬁrms take
cost structure as given
I the second stage, ﬁrms anticipate the spot market quantities that are
additionally to the forward contracted amount supplied xsmi = x
∗
i − fi,
xsmj = x
∗
j − fj. This reduces the problem of proﬁt maximization to the
optimal choice of the own forward traded amount fi, for a given own invest-
ment Ii, for a given investment of the competitor Ij as well as for a given
competitor's forward traded amount fj. In the second stage ﬁrms take the
investment decision as given, since it is made in the ﬁrst stage.
The price for each ﬁrms forward traded amount is given by the anticipated
spot market price, since speculators, which are taking the counterpart on
the forward market, have perfect foresight and build rational expectations.
Thus, no additional arbitrage proﬁt or loss is made by a ﬁrm when it is
trading forward. Therefore, all forward sales are perfectly oﬀset by the same
amount that cannot be delivered on the spot market and both ﬁrms proﬁt
functions in the second stage look as follows:
Πi = (p
∗
sm − c+ Ii) (x∗i − fi) + fi (p∗sm − c+ Ii)
=
1
9
(a− fi − fj − Ii − Ij − c) (a− c+ 2fi − fj + 2Ii − Ij)
(5)
In the second stage the ﬁrms decide about their contracted amount. Thus,
the optimal forward traded amount is found by maximizing both ﬁrms (re-
duced) proﬁt function with respect to the forward contracted amount:
fi =
1
4
(a− c− fj − 4Ii − Ij) (6)
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The optimal forward traded amount of each ﬁrm in the second stage depends
positively on the prohibition price a but negatively on the marginal costs c,
the competitor's forward traded amount fj and the investments made by each
ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage Ii, Ij. The equilibrium forward positions are found in
the intersection of both ﬁrms best response functions.
fi =
1
5
(a− c− 5Ii) (7)
With the equilibrium forward contracts the quantities that emerge from the
forward and the spot market game can be determined.
xi =
1
3
(
a+
2
5
(a− c− 5Ii) − 1
5
(a− c− 5Ij) + 2Ii − Ij − c
)
=
2
5
(a− c)
(8)
The equilibrium price in the second stage is easily determined either by set-
ting these quantities into the inverse linear demand function or by setting
the second stage forward traded amount into the equilibrium spot market
price given in equation 4:
pF =
1
5
(a− c) + c (9)
When ﬁrms are trading forward and subsequently compete in quantities, a
classical prisoners dilemma forces ﬁrms to sell forward contracts, even though
in equilibrium this makes both ﬁrms worse oﬀ (Allaz and Villa, 1993, p.5).
When ﬁrms invest, trade forward and compete in quantities this is not the
case. Then the optimal choice of forward contracts, that depend on the
ﬁrst stage investment decision, exactly oﬀsets the eﬀect of the investment
made in the ﬁrst stage for every combination of subgame perfect forward
contracts and investments. Thus, in the second stage each ﬁrms' forward
traded amount "neutralizes" the investment decision made in the ﬁrst stage.
This result independently of the functional form of the technology and its
investment costs holds, since the investment decision is made in the ﬁrst
stage.
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3.3 Decision on the level of technology, under anticipa-
tion of the forward and the spot market amount
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms perfectly anticipate the forward and spot market de-
cisions made by both ﬁrms. The ﬁrst stage proﬁt for each ﬁrm is found by
putting the quantity resulting from the forward and spot market competi-
tion into the ﬁrst stage proﬁt function. The ﬁrst stage reduced form proﬁt
function looks as follows:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c+ Ii) ∗ xi − I2i
=
2
25
(a− c)(a− c+ Ii) − I2i
(10)
The quantity of each ﬁrm sold to the consumers does neither depend on the
own investment nor on the competitior's investment. The proﬁt maximiza-
tion of each ﬁrm just is given by the trade-oﬀ between a higher contribution
margin and the investment therefore needed (without any eﬀect on quanti-
ties). Thus, competition in a narrow sense does not take place, when ﬁrms
decide about their investment and anticipate the amount traded on the for-
ward and the spot market. In this section a coeﬃcient of 1 is assumed for the
costs of the investment. The results for any coeﬃcient γ of the investment
costs can be found in the Appendix.
Remark: To avoid negative marginal costs after the decision on the level of
technology (c − Ii = c − 125(a − c) > 0) it has to be assumed, that c > 126a.
For the interpretation of the investment as an advertising campaign this as-
sumption is not needed.
This leads to following investment of each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage
Ii =
1
25
(a− c) (11)
With the subgame-perfect investment and the subgame perfect quantity, the
subgame-perfect forward traded amount, the subgame-perfect price, each
ﬁrms proﬁt, the consumer surplus σ as well as the social welfare ω, given by
both ﬁrms proﬁt and the consumer surplus can be determined.
For each subgame-perfect outcome of the decision structure investment, for-
ward trading and quantity competition the letters I,F,Q are added. This will
be helpful to compare the market results with the results for other struc-
tures of decision. For example pI,F,Q means the price that emerges, when (as
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described in this section) ﬁrstly the investment, then forward trading and
afterwards quantity competition takes place.
xI,F,Q =
2
5
(a− c) , pI,F,Q = 1
5
(a− c) + c fI,F,Q = 4
25
(a− c)
II,F,Q =
1
25
(a− c) ΠI,F,Q = 59
625
(a− c)2, σI,F,Q = 8
25
(a− c)2
ωI,F,Q =
318
625
(a− c)2
(12)
4 Mid-term strategic investment
4.1 Quantity competition, in which ﬁrms take demand
and forward contracts as given
In the third stage, each ﬁrms' prohibitive price and forward contracted amount
is given. Thus, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm can be stated as:
Πi = (a− xi − xj) (xi − fi) − (c− Ii)xi (13)
Remark: In the context of advertising, the proﬁt function should rather look
like Πi = (a + Ii − xi − xj)(xi − fi) − cxi. To ensure comparability with
the long term investment decision, the proﬁt function used above is taken.
This can be done without loss of generality, since both proﬁt functions are
equivalent.
The best quantity response of a ﬁrm due to the quantity set by the competitor
ﬁrm is given by:
xi =
1
2
(a+ fi − c+ Ii − xj) (14)
The quantities set by each ﬁrm in Nash-equilibrium is given by x∗i,j. The
quantities depend on both ﬁrms forward contracted amount and both ﬁrms
investment.
x∗i =
1
3
(a+ 2fi − fj + 2Ii − Ij − c) (15)
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With the equilibrium quantities x∗i , x
∗
j the spot-market price p
∗
sm can be
determined.
p∗sm =
1
3
(a+ 2c− fi − fj − Ii − Ij) (16)
4.2 Investment decision, in which ﬁrms take forward
contracts as given
In the second stage ﬁrms decide about their investment, knowing each ﬁrms
forward contracted amount and anticipating the quantity decision each ﬁrm
makes in the third stage. Thus, the proﬁt functions can be reduced to a
relationship of forward contracts, amount of investment, marginal costs and
the prohibitive price and look as follows:
Πi = (p
∗
sm − c+ Ii)x∗i − I2i
=
1
9
(a− c− fi − fj + 2Ii − Ij) (a− c+ 2fi − fj + 2Ii − Ij) − I2i
(17)
The best investment response of each ﬁrm in the second stage due to the
investment of the competitor is given by:
Ii =
1
5
(2a− 2c+ fi − 2fj − 2Ij) (18)
Each ﬁrms' investment depends positively on the prohibitive price a and on
the own forward traded amount fi. Each ﬁrms' investment depends nega-
tively on competitor's forward traded amount fi, competitor's investment Ij
and on marginal costs c.
Remark: Again, for the cost cutting interpretation positive marginal costs
after the investment have to be ensured. When interpreting the investment
decision in the second stage as advertising, this is not necessary. Therefore
and to ensure comparability with the results of section 3, this is not explicitly
modeled in the presented paper.
The investment chosen by each ﬁrm in Nash-equilibrium is given by I∗i , I
∗
j
and found in the intersection of the best investment reaction functions.
I∗i =
1
7
(2a− 2c+ 3fi − 4fj) (19)
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Each ﬁrms' investment depends positively on the prohibitive price a and
the own forward traded amount fi. It depends negatively on competitor's
forward traded amount fj.
With the equilibrium of investments the quantities of each ﬁrms can easily
be determined as:
xi =
1
7
(3a− 3c+ 8fi − 6fj) (20)
Each ﬁrms' quantity xi depends positively on the prohibitive price a and
positively on the own forward traded amountfi. It depends negatively on
competitor's forward traded amount fj and marginal costs c.
The equilibrium price in the second stage is easily determined either by insert-
ing these quantities into the inverse linear demand function or by inserting
the second stage forward traded amount into the equilibrium spot market
price given in equation 15.
p∗I =
1
7
(a− c− 2fi − 2fj) + c (21)
The price in the second stage depends positively on the prohibitive price a
and the marginals costs c. It depends negatively on each ﬁrms forward traded
amount fi, fj.
4.3 Decision on forward contracts, under anticipation
of investment and spot market competition
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide about the amount of forward contracts they
supply on the market. In doing so they perfectly anticipate the consequences
on both ﬁrms' investments as well as on the quantity supplied on the spot
market. Thus, the proﬁt can be reduced to a function solely depended on
each ﬁrms amount contracted forward as well as the fundamental market
conditions, which are given by marginal costs and the prohibitive price. The
proﬁt function is given by the contribution surplus multiplied by the amount
sold to the market less the investment costs resulting from both ﬁrms position
on the forward market.
Πi = (p
∗
I − c+ Ii)xi − I2i
=
1
49
(3a− 3c+ fi − 6fj) (3a− 3c+ 8fi − 6fj) − 1
49
(2a− 2c+ 3fi − 4fj)2
(22)
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The optimal amount of forward contracts of each ﬁrm in the second stage
due to the forward contracted amount of the rival is given by:
fi =
1
2
(15a− 15c− 30fj) (23)
The Nash-equilibrium forward traded amount is found in the intersection of
both ﬁrms' forward contract best response function.
f ∗i =
15
32
(a− c) (24)
With the subgame-perfect forward traded amount f ∗i , the subgame-perfect
quantity, the subgame-perfect investment, the subgame-perfect price, each
ﬁrms proﬁt, the consumer surplus σ as well as the social welfare ω can be
determined.
Note: For each subgame-perfect outcome of the decision structure forward
trading, investment and quantity competition the letters F,I,Q are added.
This will be helpful to compare the market results with the results for other
structures of decision. For example pF,I,Q means the price that emerges, when
(as described in this section) ﬁrstly forward trading, then the investment and
afterwards quantity competition takes place.
xF,I,Q =
18
32
(a− c) , pF,I,Q = −1
8
(a− c) + c, fF,I,Q = 15
32
(a− c)
IF,I,Q =
7
32
(a− c) , ΠF,I,Q = 5
512
(a− c)2 , σF,I,Q = 81
128
(a− c)2
ωF,I,Q =
167
256
(a− c)2
(25)
5 Comparison of results
Table 1 gives as a benchmark the market outcome for the decision structure
ﬁrst investment and then quantity competition as well as for the decision
structure ﬁrst forward trading and then quantity competition (Allaz and
Villa, 1993). The derivation of all results for the case of investment and
then quantity competition is shown from equation A.1 to equation A.7 in
the Appendix. The derivation of all results for the case of forward trading
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Investment, Competi-
tion
Forwards, Competition
Price pI,Q = 0, 1429 (a− c) +
c
pF,Q = 0, 2 (a− c) + c
Quantity xI,Q = 0, 4286 (a− c) xF,Q = 0, 4 (a− c)
Forwards fI,Q = 0 fF,Q = 0, 2 (a− c)
Investment II,Q = 0, 2857(a− c) IF,Q = 0
Cons. sur-
plus
σI,Q = 0, 3673 (a− c)2) σF,Q = 0, 32 (a− c)2
Proﬁt ΠI,Q = 0, 1020 (a− c)2 ΠF,Q = 0, 08 (a− c)2
Welfare ωI,Q = 0, 5714 (a− c)2 ωF,Q = 0, 48 (a− c)
Table 1: Benchmark prices, quantities etc
and then quantity competition is shown from equation A.8 to equation A.14
in the Appendix. Table 2 gives the market outcome for the decision structure
ﬁrst forward trading, then investment and then quantity competition as well
as for the decision structure ﬁrst investment, then forward trading and then
quantity competition. The results for the decision structure forward trading,
then investment and subsequently quantity competition have been derived
in section 3 and can be found in a concentrated form in equation 12.
The results for the decision structure, investment, forward trading and then
quantity competition have been derived in section 4 and can be found in a
concentrated form in equation 25. For the sake of comparability all results
in table 1 and 2 are shown in decimal numeration.
The price chosen by each ﬁrm, when ﬁrms are able to invest, trade forward
and compete in quantities is equal to the price when they solely trade for-
ward and compete in quantities (pI,F,Q = pF,Q =
1
5
(a − c) + c). This price
(pI,F,Q = pF,Q) is above the price resulting from competition with an invest-
ment decision before quantity competition (pI,Q =
1
7
(a− c). The lowest price
results from forward trading, decision on investment and quantity competi-
tion (pI,F,Q = −18 (a− c) + c).
15
Forwards, Investment,
Competition
Investment, Forwards,
Competition
Price pF,I,Q =
−0, 125 (a− c) + c
pI,F,Q = 0, 2 (a− c) + c
Quantity xF,I,Q = 0, 5625 (a− c) xI,F,Q = 0, 4 (a− c)
Forwards fF,I,Q = 0, 4686 (a− c) fI,F,Q = 0, 16 (a− c)
Investment IF,I,Q = 0, 2188 (a− c) II,F,Q = 0, 04 (a− c)
Cons. sur-
plus
σF,I,Q = 0, 6328 (a− c)2 σI,F,Q = 0, 32 (a− c)2
Proﬁt ΠF,I,Q =
0, 0098 (a− c)2
ΠI,F,Q =
0, 0944 (a− c)2
Welfare ωF,I,Q =
0, 6523 (a− c)2
ωI,F,Q =
0, 5088 (a− c)2
Table 2: New results: Forward Trading, Investment and Quantity
Thus, the resulting prices can be ordered as:
pF,I,Q < pI,Q < pI,F,Q = pF,Q (26)
For the quantities supplied by both ﬁrms the order is the other way round.
The quantity when both ﬁrms decide about their investment, choose their for-
ward contracts, decide and compete in quantities equals the quantity supplied
when both ﬁrms decide about forward contracts (xI,F,Q = xF,Q = 0.4 (a− c)).
This quantity is below the quantity chosen by ﬁrms when both ﬁrms decide
about their investment and compete in quantities (xI,Q =
3
7
(a− c)). The
highest quantity results from forward trading, decision on investment and
quantity competition (xF,I,Q =
18
32
(a− c)).
Thus, the resulting quantities can be ordered as:
xF,Q = xI,F,Q < xI,Q < xF,I,Q (27)
When ﬁrms solely decide about their investment and compete in quanti-
ties, by deﬁnition the amount traded forward is zero (fI,Q = 0). Then the
smallest (positive) amount is traded forward when ﬁrms decide about their
16
investment, trade forward and compete in quantities (fI,F,Q =
15
32
(a− c)).
When ﬁrms solely decide about forward contracts and compete in quantities,
a larger amount is traded forward (fF,Q =
2
5
(a− c)). When ﬁrms ﬁrstly
decide about the amount traded forward, then decide about their investment
and subsequently compete in quantities, the largest amount is traded forward
(fF,I,Q =
15
32
(a− c)).
Thus, the forward traded amount can be ordered as:
fI,Q < fI,F,Q < fF,Q < fF,I,Q (28)
For strategic reasons ﬁrms choose a relatively low forward traded amount,
when the investment decision takes place in the ﬁrst round, whereas ﬁrms
choose a relatively high amount traded forward, when the decision on the
forward traded amount takes place in the ﬁrst round. Following the strategic
taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) one can state: Firms under-invest
in the strategic variable (forward traded amount), when the investment deci-
sion takes place in the ﬁrst round. Firms over-invest in the strategic variable
(forward traded amount), when the decision on the forward traded amount
takes place in the ﬁrst round.
When ﬁrms solely decide about their forward traded amount and compete in
quantities, by deﬁnition the investment is zero (II,Q = 0). Then the small-
est (positive) amount is invested when ﬁrms decide about their investment,
trade forward and compete in quantities (II,F,Q =
1
25
(a− c)). When ﬁrms
ﬁrstly decide about the amount traded forward, then decide about their in-
vestment and subsequently compete in quantities, a larger investment is done
(IF,I,Q =
7
32
(a− c)). When ﬁrms solely decide about their investment and
compete in quantities, the highest investment is done(II,Q =
2
7
(a− c)).
Thus, the resulting investment can be ordered as:
IF,Q < II,F,Q < IF,I,Q < II,Q (29)
For strategic reasons ﬁrms choose a relatively low investment, when the in-
vestment decision takes place in the ﬁrst round, whereas ﬁrms choose a rel-
atively high investment, when the decision on the forward traded amount
takes place in the ﬁrst round. Due to the strategic taxonomy of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984) one can state in turn: Firms under-invest in the strategic
variable (investment), when the investment decision takes place in the ﬁrst
round. Firms over-invest in the strategic variable (investment), when the
decision on the forward traded amount takes place in the ﬁrst round.
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Thus, ﬁrms under-invest in both strategic variables (forward traded amount
and investment) and choose a "puppy-dog strategy", when the investment
decision takes place in the ﬁrst round, whereas ﬁrms strategically over-invest
and choose a "top-dog strategy", when the decision on the forward traded
amount takes place in the ﬁrst round. The diﬀerent strategic behavior of the
competitors can mainly be explained by the cost of their investment and the
anticipation of (ﬁerce) competition.
A long-term decision on the technology in the ﬁrst stage is associated with
investment costs, but an increase in proﬁtability. When there exists ﬁerce
competition in the second stage, that is induced by the existence of a for-
ward market, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is mainly determined by the forces of
competition and not by the contribution margin. Firms anticipate that and
are reluctant to invest.
For a mid-term decision on the strategic investment, ﬁrms decide in the ﬁrst
stage about the amount they want to trade forward. The forward traded
amount does not lead to direct costs and ﬁrms do not incorporate the neg-
ative externality on the price. However, with forward contracts each ﬁrm
increases the quantity sold. Thus, in equilibrium the prisoners dilemma de-
scribed by Allaz and Villa (1993) occurs. After the decision on the forward
traded amount in the second stage, ﬁrms decide about their investment.
This investment is below the investment for the two-stage investment and
then quantity competition game, since the demand to meet on the spot mar-
ket is decreased by forward sales. However, it is above the investment for a
long-term investment decision, since ﬁrms have due to the upcoming quan-
tity competition a rather large incentive to invest.
The smallest consumer surplus results when ﬁrms either solely trade forward
and compete in quantities or ﬁrms invest, trade forward and compete in
quantities (σI,F,Q = σF,Q =
8
25
). A larger consumer surplus results, when
ﬁrms solely decide about their investment and and compete in quantities
(σI,Q =
2
7
(a − c)). The highest consumer surplus results when ﬁrms trade
forward, then decide about their investment and subsequently compete in
quantities (σF,I,Q =
81
128
(a− c)2).
Thus, the resulting consumer surplus can be ordered as:
σI,F,Q = σF,Q < σI,Q < σF,I,Q (30)
The lowest proﬁt is realized by ﬁrms when they trade forward, decide about
their investment and subsequently compete in quantities (ΠF,I,Q =
5
512
).
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A higher proﬁt is realized by ﬁrms, when they trade forward and com-
pete in quantities (ΠF,Q =
2
25
(a− c)). When ﬁrms invest, then trade for-
ward and subsequently compete in quantities, they earn a slightly higher
proﬁt(ΠI,F,Q =
59
625
(a− c)), even though the quantities and prices are the
same as when they trade forward and compete in quantities. This comes
from the fact, that the higher contribution surplus (through reduction of
marginal costs or a demand increase) induced by the investment is not
passed over to the consumers. The diﬀerence of both proﬁts is exactly given
by the gain in contribution surplus from the investment times the quantity
sold by each ﬁrm less the cost of investment ∆Π = xI,F,Q II,F,Q − I2I,F,Q =
1
25
(a− c) 4
10
(a− c)− 1
252
(a− c)2 = 9
625
(a− c)2. The highest proﬁt is earned
by each ﬁrm, when ﬁrms invest and subsequently compete in quantities
(ΠI,Q =
5
49
(a− c)). Thus, the resulting proﬁts can be ordered as:
ΠF,I,Q < ΠF,Q < ΠI,F,Q < ΠI,Q (31)
The lowest welfare results when ﬁrms ﬁrst decide about forward contracts
and then compete in quantities (ωF,Q = 12
25
(a− c)). When ﬁrms invest,
then trade forward and subsequently compete in quantities, the welfare is
slightly higher (ωI, F,Q = 318
625
(a− c)2). This increase comes from the gains
of the investment, which increase ﬁrms' proﬁts but do not alter the consumer
surplus. A higher welfare is realized, when ﬁrms decide about the investment
and then compete in quantities (ωI,Q =
4
7
(a− c)2). The highest welfare is
realized, when ﬁrms ﬁrstly decide about their forward contracts, then decide
about their investment and subsequently compete in quantities (ωF,I,Q =
167
256
(a− c)).
Thus, the resulting welfare can be ordered as:
ωF,Q = ωI,F,Q < ωI,Q < ωF,I,Q (32)
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is the strategic interaction between competing ﬁrms
and its inﬂuence on their investment decisions, on their forward traded
amount and on spot market competition. Therefore, in section 3 a long term
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strategic investment decision, that takes place before ﬁrms engage in forward
contracts and compete in quantities on the spot market has been modeled.
For this kind of long-term investment decision, ﬁrms choose a "puppy-dog
strategy" for their investment as well as for their forward traded amount.
In section 4 a mid term strategic investment decision, that takes place af-
ter ﬁrms have choosen their forward contracts but before ﬁrms compete in
quantities on the spot market has been modeled. For this kind of mid-term
investment decision, ﬁrms choose a "top-dog strategy" for their investment
as well as for their forward traded amount.
Section 5 compared the results, found in section 3 and section 4 with each
other as well as with the results of a two stage game, where in the ﬁrst stage
ﬁrms either decide about investment or on the amount traded forward and
in a second stage ﬁrms compete in quantities.
For a long-term investment decision the "the-puppy dog strategy" with it's
rather small forward traded amount and investment leads to a relatively
small amount supplied to the market, a relatively high price, relatively high
proﬁts of ﬁrms, a low consumer surplus and a relatively small social welfare.
Therefore, when ﬁrms investments mainly can be viewed as long-term, intro-
duction of a forward market has a welfare decreasing eﬀect.
For a mid-term investment decision the "top-dog strategy"' with it's rather
large forward traded amount and investment leads to a relatively high amount
supplied to the market, a relatively low price, relatively low proﬁts of ﬁrms,
a higher consumer surplus and a relatively large social welfare. Therefore,
when ﬁrms investments mainly can be viewed as mid-term, introduction of
a forward market has an welfare enhancing eﬀect.
Looking at strategic aspects, forward trading and competition one can con-
clude: The social desirability of a forward market, where ﬁrms additionally
to the spot market supply their commodity, critically depends on the typical
time horizon of the investments made by ﬁrms:
For investment decisions, that mainly have a mid-term time horizon, the in-
troduction of a forward market is social favorable. However, for investment
decisions, that mainly have a long-term time horizon, the introduction of a
forward market signiﬁcantly decreases social welfare!
For the policy makers of the German Energy turnaround there is follow-
ing more general insight: The overall eﬀect of a pro-competitive instrument
critically depends on it's inﬂuence on other strategic decisions and their time-
horizon.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Benchmark: Investment Decision and Quantity Com-
petition
When ﬁrms have to decide in the ﬁrst stage on an investment decision and
in the second stage on the quantity they supply to the market, the market
results again can be found by backward induction.
Stage 1. Cost reducing investment:
Firms decide about a cost reducing investment. They anticipate the
eﬀect on the quantities being delivered on the spot market.
Stage 2. Quantity competition:
Firms take the cost structure of both ﬁrms as given and decide about
the quantity they want to supply on the spot market
Stage 1. proﬁt function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c+ Ii)xi − I2i (A.1)
Stage 2. proﬁt function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c+ Ii)xi (A.2)
Stage 2. reaction function:
xi =
1
2
(a− xj − c+ Ii) (A.3)
Stage 2. Nash-Equilibrium
x∗i =
1
3
(a− c+ 2Ii − Ij)
p∗ =
1
3
(a− c− Ii − Ij) + c
(A.4)
Stage 1. reduced proﬁt function
Πi =
1
9
(a− c+ 2Ii − Ij)2 − I2i (A.5)
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Stage 1. reaction function:
Ii =
2
5
(a− c− Ii) (A.6)
Stage 1. Nash-Equilibrium
I∗i = I
∗
j =
2
7
(a− c) p∗ = 1
7
(a− c) + c, xi = xj = 3
7
(a− c)
Πi = Πj =
5
49
(a− c)2 , σ = 18
49
(a− c)2 , ω = 4
7
(a− c)2
(A.7)
7.2 Benchmark: Forward Trading and Quantity Com-
petition
Stage 1. Forward trading:
Firms decide about the amount they want to trade on the forward
market. They anticipate the eﬀect on the quantities being delivered on
the spot market.
Stage 2. Quantity competition:
Firms take the forward traded amount as given and decide about the
quantity they want to supply on the spot market
Stage 1. proﬁt function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c)xi (A.8)
Stage 2. proﬁt function:
Πi = (a− xi − xj − c) (xi − fi) − cxi (A.9)
Stage 2. reaction functions
xi =
1
2
(a− c+ fi − xj) (A.10)
Stage 2. Nash-Equilibrium
x∗i =
1
3
(a− c+ 2fi − fj)
p∗ =
1
3
(a− c− fi − fj) + c
(A.11)
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Stage 1. reduced proﬁt function
Πi =
1
9
(a− c− fi − fj) (a− c+ 2fi − fj) (A.12)
Stage 1. reaction function:
fi =
1
4
(a− c− fj) (A.13)
Stage 1. Nash-Equilibrium
fF,Q∗ = 1
5
(a− c) pF,Q = 1
5
(a− c) + c, xF,Q = 2
5
(a− c)
ΠF,Q =
2
25
(a− c)2 , σF,Q = 8
25
(a− c)2 , ωF,Q = 12
25
(a− c)2
(A.14)
7.3 Variable coeﬃcient of the quadratic costs of invest-
ment
The presented speciﬁcation of the model in section 3 has a coeﬃcient of 1
in front of the investment costs. Here I show, that the results hold true
for any coeﬃcient γ in front of the investment costs. In stage 2 and in
stage 3 the costs of investments do not inﬂuence any result, since the level of
technology Ii is taken as given. In stage 1 ﬁrms decide about their investment
in technology. The proﬁt function looks as follows:
Πi =
2
25
(a− c) (a− c+ Ii) − γI2i (A.15)
Proﬁt maximization with respect to the level of technology Ii leads to:
Ii =
1
25γ
(a− c) (A.16)
Leading to a total output xi, to a forward traded amountfi and to the amount
traded on the spot market xi − fi of:
xi =
2
25
(a− c) , fi = 1
25γ
(a− c) (5γ − 1) , xi − fi = 5γ + 1
25
(a− c)
(A.17)
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Hence, the total output of a ﬁrm xi is unchanged, from a diﬀerent coeﬃcient
of the cost of investment. However, the coeﬃcient γ changes the proportion of
the output sold on the spot market and total output as well as the proportion
of the output sold on the forward market and total output.
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